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Abstract 
Loan refusal has been a problem facing many loan applicants at the household level and 
this problem is not new to loan applicants in Ghana. Despite this knowledge, researchers 
passively discuss loan refusal and do not consider the intensity of this problem. This study 
analyses the effect of household income and savings on loan refusal and the intensity of loan 
refusal in Ghana using the fifth round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS-5). The 
study employs the direct elicitation approach to identifying credit constrained (loan refused) 
households and makes use of the Logit and Poisson regression to regress the loan refusal 
variable on other covariates. The Logit model is applied to loan refusal as a binary variable 
(refused and not refused) while the Poisson is applied to loan refusal as a count variable 
(number of times of loan refusal). The econometric analysis of 1,600 and 1,591 households for 
the loan refusal and intensity of loan refusal respectively shows that income and savings 
inversely relate to loan refusal and the intensity of loan refusal at their respective significance 
levels. It is also shown that low-income and low-savings households are more likely to be 
discouraged from loan applications than their counterparts in high-income and savings 
households. Financial institutions are called upon to generally widen their coverage and to 
extend their activities more into the rural areas so as to increase the stock of loanable funds 
available to rural dwellers. This will reduce the vulnerability of rural dwellers when it comes to 
loan refusal. 
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Introduction  
All over the world, it has been established that better access to credit reduces household 
consumption volatility, improves investment/production opportunities, eases the constraints on 
small and family businesses, and diversifies household and financial sector assets (IMF, 2006). 
The welfare gains from such expansion can be sizable, making further growth of household 
credit desirable. According to, Diagne, Zeller and Sharma (2000) there are, at least, two channels 
through which access to credit affects household welfare outcomes. 
In the first instance, it alleviates the capital constraints on households. These households 
incur expenditure on agricultural inputs during the planting and growth periods of crops, while 
earnings are received several months after the harvest. The second channel is by increasing its 
risk-bearing ability and altering its risk-coping strategy. When a household possesses the 
knowledge that it can still access credit to smoothen consumption even in a situation of an 
income shortfall resulting from a potentially profitable but risky investment turning out to be 
unprofitable, that household will be prompted to bear the additional risk (Diagne et al., 2000) 
and may therefore be willing to adopt new, more risky technologies (Eswaran & Kotwal, 1990).  
Even if a household is not borrowing, the mere access to credit, with a borrowing option, helps 
that household to avoid adopting risk-reducing, but inefficient economic activities such as 
precautionary motives that come with negative returns. 
However, access to credit has been a problem to households and to small businesses all 
over the world. Crook and Hochguertel (2005) explored credit demand and credit constraints in 
the U.S., Italy and the Netherlands and found that lower age and less wealth (low income) 
increase loan applicants’ risk of being constrained. Faced with these constraints, good borrowers 
who end up becoming discouraged borrowers, may not apply to banks for loans because they feel 
they will be rejected if they do. The feeling alone is the underlying reason for their 
discouragement. Of those who applied, Crook and Hochguertel went on to show that a much 
higher proportion is rejected in the U.S. compared to other countries. A comparative 
consideration of discouraged borrowers showed that a considerably small percentage of Italian 
and Dutch households are credit constrained, compared with U.S. households.  
In Africa, Kedir, Ibrahim and Torres (2007) undertook a study in Ethiopia and found that 
the two major reasons for discouragement in borrowing are households’ perception of the 
success probability of their loan application and lack of collateral. For instance, 47.9 percent of 
the discouraged prospective borrowers did not apply because they believed they would not be 
successful, while 32.8 percent of them did not apply because they did not have collateral. The 
interest rate and loan processing time were also mentioned as deterrents to loan application. As 
established by Levenson and Willard (2000) and Freel et al. (2012), discouraged borrowers were 
recognized to be twice as many as applicants who have been denied or refused credit. Again, 
being constrained may vary across some demographic characteristics of borrowers (Vos, Yeh, 
Carter & Tagg, 2007).  
In Ghana, about 90 percent of households and small firms are refused loans when they 
apply to the formal financial intermediaries due to inability to fulfill conditions such as collateral 
security (Bigsten et al., 2003). Many small firms for reasons such as very difficult processes and 
fear that they will be refused if even applied, do refuse to apply for formal loans. It is therefore a 
common phenomenon to see most of the households and small scale enterprises (SSEs) resorting 
to “traditional” sources of finance such as company-retained earnings, personal savings, 
borrowing from friends and relatives, supplier credit, borrowing from moneylenders, and other 
3 
 
sources including “Susu” revolving fund and inheritance (Abor, 2007). Grundling and Kaseke 
(2010) showed in the FinScope Ghana 2010 report that the proportion of the adult population in 
Ghana who are financially served are 56 percent. From this figure, those served by the formal 
financial institution are 40.7 percent, those served by the informal financial institutions are 15.3 
percent and those who do not have or use any financial product are 44.9 percent. 
Household income also has the potential to affect a particular household’s access to 
credit, especially when it comes to loan refusal. According to Fernando (2007), low income-
households’ problems in accessing credit have different dimensions. The most conspicuous 
dimension is that the majority of the low-income populations in developing countries do not have 
access to very basic financial services. In the developing economies again, it is shown that adults 
in the richest quintile are, on average, more than twice likely to own formal account than those in 
the poorest quintile (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012). In Ghana, it has been observed that low-
income people have been offered very little to no services by the formal financial sector and has, 
in effect, created a high demand for credit and savings services amongst the poor (Gyemibi, 
Mensah, Opoku, Appiah & Akyaa, 2011). From the evidence above, it is suggestive that low 
income households stand a higher chance of being refused loan compared to high income 
households.  
When considering household savings, research has shown that some financial institutions 
place a very high premium on savings when advancing loans to potential and/or existing clients. 
Even in some cases, potential loan beneficiaries are required to have a pre-determined amount of 
savings before benefiting from any loan facility. This is what has come to be known in the 
literature as compulsory savings. In relation to the type of savings, Goldstein et al. (1999) in 
Mensah (2009) identified two categories – voluntary and compulsory savings.  
Figure 1 displays the percentage of loan refusals across the three most-recent rounds 
of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS 3 to GLSS 5). It can be seen from the figure 
that in the year 1991/1992, the percentage of households that was refused loans, from a 
sample of 4,552 households, was 8.0 percent and Ghana saw a reduction in this figure to 
3.0 percent in the year 1998/1999, from a sample of 5, 998 households, in the GLSS 4. By 
inference, the percentage of loan refusals faced by households fell by five percent which 
was quite encouraging. Despite the remarkable reduction in the percentage of loan refusals 
that was experienced by Ghanaian households in the year 1998/1999, this figure increased 
to 4.5 percent, from a sample of 8,687 households, in the year 2005/2006 which raises 
some concerns. This is because households require access to credit to be able to be able to 
start business. The legitimate questions to ask then are, why the increase in the percentage 
of loan refusals? What factors accounted for the increase in the percentage of loan refusals? 
And as vague as the percentages of loan refusals look, what is the intensity of this loan 
refusal to specific categories of households in the country? 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Households Loan Refusals in Ghana 
Source: Computed from GLSS 3, GLSS 4, GLSS 5  
 
Credit constraint facing households has several implications, ranging from child labour to 
challenges in households’ consumption smoothing. Research has shown that credit constraint to 
households play a role in explaining child labour (Beegle, Dehejia & Gatti, 2003), fuel domestic 
violence (Peprah & Koomson, 2014) and drive the use of credit for consumption, thereby making 
credit constraints an important impediment to inter-temporal consumption smoothing for many 
households (Annim, Dasmani & Armah, 2011). Loan refusal, as an extreme form of credit 
constraint, results in self-financing and maximizes the risk of premature liquidation of productive 
investments that arise due to households’ unpredictable future liquidity crises coupled with the 
slow cycle of returns. In this wise, economic agents who experience unexpected liquidity 
pressures may be forced to prematurely liquidate their investments in the absence of financial 
intermediaries, especially if they are self-financed (Bencivenga & Smith, 1991).  
To explore the issue of loan refusal, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) wrote on “Credit 
Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information” and indicated that credit constraint or loan 
refusal is a long-term equilibrium because of the information asymmetry and adverse selection 
effect. This triggered a lot of research interest as to what really causes loan refusal. Kon and 
Storey (2003) later developed the theory of discouraged borrowers and showed that borrowers do 
not apply for loans because the imperfect credit screening mechanism by financial institutions 
gives biased signal to borrowers into wrongly feeling that they will be rejected if they ever 
applied.  
Jappelli (1990) and Cheng (2009) did similar studies and found income, wealth, savings 
and many others to be the factors that constrain access to credit.  In as much as these studies give 
insightful revelations regarding the factors that constrain access to credit (and passively rope in 
loan refusal), none of them has gone a step further to examine loan refusal as the main subject of 
study and to even go ahead to consider the intensity (incidence) of the loan refusal. Again, a 
parametric study of how these variables affect loan refusal in Ghana has not been done.  
The main objective of this research is to analyse the effect of household income and 
savings on loan refusal and the intensity of loan refusal in Ghana. Specifically, it seeks to 
determine the effect of income and savings, respectively, on loan refusal and the intensity of loan 
refusal in Ghana. The hypotheses to be tested are as follows: income does not have an effect on 
loan refusal; savings has no effect on loan refusal; income does not have an influence on the 
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intensity of loan refusal; and savings does not have an effect on the intensity of loan refusal. 
Conclusions drawn from these tests will aid in the designing of policies to reduce the problem of 
loan refusal to households. 
Attempting to alleviate the problems associated with loan refusal will need an in-depth 
knowledge of what causes it. The distinct methodological approach adopted for this study will 
add to the very scanty literature on issues concerning loan refusal around the world and in Ghana 
to be specific. The concept of loan refusal has a two-pronged approach. It is either looked at 
from the demand-side or from the supply-side. This research is restricted to the demand-side 
(specifically from the household level) to look at household level characteristics that effect loan 
refusal which, by implication, shrouds the effects that the interplay of supply-side and household 
variables have on loan refusal. The remaining sections of this paper are arranged as follows: the 
next section covers literature, both theoretical and empirical. Section three considers the 
methodology which also covers data and the empirical model. Section four provides the results 
and discussion of findings and section six concludes the study. 
 
Literature  
The literature review begins with the theory of credit rationing, moves on to the theory of 
discouraged borrowers and end with the empirical literature. This sequence is chosen because the 
theory of discouraged borrowers, which is the main theory for this study, is quite recent and falls 
under the theory of credit rationing.  
Afonso and Aubyn (1998) define credit rationing as a situation where demand for loans 
exceeds supply at the prevailing interest rate and also where the price of a loan (the interest rate) 
does not fully adjust to completely satisfy the demand. This means that, among loan applicants, 
some will get loan while others will not. Keeton (1979) explains credit rationing as occurring in 
two ways: either borrowers are not given the full amount of credit they applied for (“type I 
rationing”) or some of them are completely turned down (“type II rationing”). The credit 
rationing model developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) essentially stated that the interest rate 
that is used as a sorting device by the lender may affect the riskiness of the pool of borrowers. 
Stiglitz and Weiss went on to say that although the risk of a project is reflected by the variance of 
returns, lenders can observe the mean returns from the projects but not their variance. In the 
Stiglitz-Weiss model, all projects have the same mean but different variances (mean-preserving 
spreads). Under this sort of imperfect information, Stiglitz and Weiss show that expected returns 
to the lender increase with the interest rate only up to a point. 
 
Theory of Discouraged Borrowers 
In the labour market, a discouraged worker is defined as an individual who wants a job 
and is available for work but does not look for a job because he/she anticipates that he/she will 
not get one after many trials to get one had failed (Benati, 2001). Similarly, in the credit market, 
Kon and Storey (2003) define discouraged borrowers as good borrowers who do not apply for a 
loan to a bank because they feel they will be refused. The theory was developed by Kon and 
Story (2003) and it builds on credit rationing which stems from  the asymmetric information 
model by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and De Meza and Webb (1987). The authors of these 
papers argue that, in equilibrium, markets are imperfect since credit is allocated by rationing, 
rather than price. The theoretical issues addressed in these papers have set the tone for more 
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empirical papers on credit rationing in many countries, examples of which include Berger and 
Udell (1992); Peterson and Rajan (1994).  
Under a range of assumptions, Kon and Storey (2003) stated that the scale of 
discouragement in an economy depends upon the screening error of the banks, the scale of 
application costs and the degree to which the bank interest rate differs from that charged by the 
money lender. They showed that discouragement is at a maximum where there is some, but not 
perfect information. It can also be shown that household income also affects borrower 
discouragement. A study by Weller  (2009) showed that the share of low-income families who 
felt discouraged from applying for credit was more than twice that of middle-income families 
and almost nine times that of high-income families. Also, interest charged on debt tend to be 
higher for lower-income families.  
According to the study by Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger (2008) and Kon and Storey 
(2003) cited in Cheng (2009), two reasons account for demand-side credit constraints. One is 
high transaction cost and risk cost and the other is the mistakes in screening for effective 
borrowers and cognitive biases for the screening mechanism. Cheng (2009) went ahead to state 
that demand-side credit constraints could be eventually attributed to the imperfect institutional 
arrangement of formal finance, but its formation is deeply related to households’ cognitive 
biases and risk aversion preference. Cheng’s version of the theory of discouraged borrowers, 
which he specifically made demand-side, depicted the rationing of credit as occurring in three 
forms. These forms of credit rationing and their causes are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Types of Credit Rationing and their Cause 
Type of Credit Rationing Cause of  Credit Rationing 
Type I Application cost resulting preparation of application 
material, travelling time and cost, psychological 
discomfort and gifts or treating 
Type II Extra cost caused by financial institutions’ inability to 
effectively screen borrowers’ credit and risk 
Type III Households’ risk aversion toward loan application 
Source: Cheng (2009) 
Empirical Literature 
This section reviews literature on the relationship between household level characteristics 
and the dependent variables used for the analysis. Although, in some cases, these variables 
explain their effect only from the demand, as is the focus of the paper, Kedir, Ibrahim and Torres 
(2007), stated that it is important to note that these variables can reflect both determinants of 
demand for credit and determinants of supply of credit. Hence, in some cases the effects of the 
independent variables on the probability of being credit constrained may be a priori ambiguous, 
as demand and supply factors may be working in the same direction. An example is when using 
educational level as an explanatory variable. While the financial institutions may place much 
premium on loan applicants’ educational level and refuse granting loan to those with low 
educational level, a household with lower educational level will by itself find it difficult to 
understand and comply with the terms of the loan contract and in effect be refused the loan 
7 
 
Household Income 
Low-income households find it difficult to acquire collateral to use in securing loans. 
Low-income families have multiple reasons for which they would want to smoothen their 
income over short-term fluctuations due to less stable employment and earnings. As a result, they 
have an ongoing need for financial services that can make it easier for them to save or to access 
credit. Low-income families often lack access to financial services that middle-income families 
take for granted. There are a number of reasons why low-income families tend to be unbanked 
(United Nations, 2000). Financial institutions frequently require credit checks to open an 
account, set high minimum account balances, and have high overdraft-fee characteristics that are 
ill-suited to low-income earners (Blank & Barr, 2009). It can be inferred that household income 
is very vital in loan acquisition and that low-income households are more likely to be refused 
loans, compared to high-income households.  
 
Savings and Loan Refusal  
Some microfinance institutions (MFIs) require borrowers to make compulsory deposits 
before they can benefit from a loan; usually, borrowers must maintain these deposits during the 
life of the loan (Rosenberg, Gonzalez & Narain, 2010). About one-third of the sustainable MFIs 
reporting to Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) for 2006 required such savings deposits 
and, on the average, these MFIs are smaller than the ones that do not use compulsory savings. 
Personal savings serve as a form of economic security for the household. It also provides formal 
financial institutions with a financial history on which they can base lending decisions (Morris & 
Meyer, 1993). Mohamed (2003) notes that few rural people actually make use of banks for 
saving and borrowing.  
Adjei, Arun, and Hossain (2009) studied the Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT) and found a positive 
relationship between loan amount and savings deposits. Thus, all members of SAT who had 
benefited from loan facilities from the programme must have at least 10 per cent of such loan 
amount in the form of savings deposits prior to the disbursement of their loans. Such Sollateral 
Savings are used as guarantee for individual, and, sometimes group loans. The required sum can 
be as much as 50 percent of the credit one wishes to apply for. 
  
Age of Household Head 
Kimuyu and Omiti (2000) conducted an extensive study in Kenya and came out with 
findings which demonstrated that age is associated with access to credit in that younger 
applicants are likely to be refused credit than older applicants. Lore (2007) cited in Mukiri 
(2011) also reveals that younger loan applicants in Kenya are more likely to face constraints in 
accessing bank loans than older people and went ahead to state that age is an indicator of useful 
experience in self-selection in the credit market. This self-selection is an important aspect of 
decision making styles. Older applicants also tend to have higher levels of work experience, 
education, wealth and social contacts. These resources are important in developing key 
competencies. Therefore, superior age leads to higher levels of entrepreneurial orientation. 
 
Educational Level  
Again, Owuor (2009) observed in Kenya that literacy and education level have a 
significant positive influence on households’ ability to access credit information which means, to 
the contrary, that a lower educational level will limit the ability to access this credit information 
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which can also limit access to credit and eventually increase the potential of possible loan 
refusal. Education, which translated into human capital development, is positively associated 
with some knowledge of bank loan application procedure (Storey, 1994). Higher levels of formal 
education are mostly restricted to non-poor households hardly found in the rural areas. It is 
therefore expected that the majority of rural households would be highly discouraged from 
applying for credit (Sebu, 2013). 
 
Sex 
The sex of the household head may affect the household’s probability of being refused 
loan. There is a general belief that women are discriminated against informal credit markets 
(Mohamed, 2003). According to Amu (2005), women lack access to and/or are likely to be 
refused credit.  In some cases, women are unwilling to access such facilities where they are 
available. Amu goes on to say that since banks require collateral, women who do not have land 
titles to use as collateral are left out of the credit market since their produce are not a good 
guarantee for bankers, unlike the cash crops such as cocoa, which is largely grown by men. 
However, Kedir et al. (2007) observed from studies in Ethiopia that formal financial institutions 
offered more loans to female-headed households than male-headed households. 
 
Location 
Geographic location affects a household’s access to credit. This is to say that differences 
exist in rural and urban dwellers’ access to credit (Leyshon & Thrift, 1996) and that rural 
dwellers are discriminated against when accessing credit from financial institutions. The writers 
go on to say that this discrimination is mostly prominent in deprived areas such as the rural 
communities in Africa where there is a lack of economic and infrastructural development such as 
financial institutions. To them, poor locations are expected to be deprived of financial services 
and households that are sited in such locations may even lack the means to afford the collateral 
requirements. Finally, the expectation of Leyshon and Thrift was that households in the rural 
north and south of Malawi will be more discouraged from borrowing. 
 
Study methodology 
Theoretical Model 
For a household to feel discouraged, as a result of its perception about high transaction 
cost on a loan contract, it must first of all have a liquidity constraint that will compel it to go to a 
particular financial institution to seek credit in order to smoothen consumption. It is upon this 
loan application that the household is either granted or refused the loan.  This analysis of loan 
refusal follows but modifies the credit constraint paradigm of Jappelli (1990) and employs the 
statement of the indirect form of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH). Unlike the above mentioned 
studies of credit constraint that consider households that applied but were not given the full 
amount, this study considered households that have been entirely refused loan and shifted the 
analysis from Type I to Type II credit rationing (Keeton, 1979). The theoretical model then 
proceeds as follows. 
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Modified Version of Jappelli’s Model to suit Loan Refusal 
A household is not liquidity constrained if; 
                              rAYC  1*                                           (1)    
A household is said to be constrained if  
                               DrAYC  1*                                    (2) 
Where *C is optimal consumption in the absence of the current borrowing constraint and 
r is the exogenous real rate of interest. A = the resources available to each household (non-
human wealth) and D = the amount that the household can borrow. Two factors determine 
whether the constraint binds: (i) how much the individual would like to borrow, that is, the 
difference between *C  and available resources; and (ii) how much financial intermediaries are 
willing to lend to that individual, that is, the right hand side of (2).  
To make the case of loan refusal operational, these three assumptions are made. 
 
Assumptions 
1. Upon application, the household either obtains the full amount or is refused entirely. 
2. In the cross section the reduced form for *C  is expressed as eXC  '* , where X is a 
matrix of observable cross-sectional variables such as current income, savings, age, 
demographic characteristics, education, and so on. The matrix of observables may also 
include quadratic and interaction terms for some variables. The vector of parameter, , is 
common to all households, and the vector, e , is an error term that is specific to each 
household. *C  is further assumed to be increasing in both wealth and current income with 
propensities to consume out of income and savings. 
3. The debt ceiling D is also a function of the same variables as desired consumption plus an 
error term that captures unobservable variables,   'XD . Since collaterals protect 
lenders from the risk of default and help them to discriminate against risky borrowers, it is 
assumed that D  is increasing in household’s savings and current income.  
After applying for the loan, equation (2) becomes,  
                                 DrAYC  1*                             (3) 
From the assumptions above, it follows that equation (3) can be rewritten as 
                          0'1'   eXrAYX      (4) 
Although desired consumption and the debt ceiling are both unobservable, the section 
above has identified some individuals on whom the loan refusal binds (that is, the refused 
applicants and the discouraged borrowers). We can then define the dummy variable as stated in 
equation (5), where LR represents loan refusal. 
                          0'  XLR                                   (5)                                         
 
0' if 1  XLR  (the household is refused the loan) 
0' if 0  XLR  (the consumer is not refused the loan)  
Where   is a linear combination of the parameters of the expression in (2) and 
  e . The probability that a household is refused loan, conditional on the variables 
available, X , in the cross section, is  'XFP  , where (.)F  is assumed to be the logit 
distribution function and 'X  is the reduced form of the excess demand for loans. 
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Estimation Techniques and Models 
Estimation of the Logit Model  
(6)                                     
1
ln i21  






 i
i
i
i X
P
P
L  
To estimate (6), we need, apart from Xi, the values of the regressand, or logit, Li. This 
depends on the type of data available for analysis. We distinguish two types of data: (1) data at 
the individual, or micro, level, and (2) grouped or replicated data. This study uses data at the 
individual/household/micro level in which case OLS estimation of (6) is infeasible. Pi = 1 if a 
household is refused loan and Pi = 0 if it is not refused loan. Putting these values directly into the 
logit Li, we obtain: 







0
1
lniL   if a household is refused loan 







1
0
lniL  if a household is not refused loan 
 
Empirical Model Specification 
(8)                                                                 Re                            
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The Poisson Regression Model – Intensity of Loan Refusal 
According to Gujarati (2004), a Poisson regression treats the number of loan refusals as 
a Poisson random variable with an intensity hypothesized to depend on posited explanatory 
variables. The key assumption that underlies the Poisson Regression Model is the 
equality in the expected value and the variance of the error terms. 
 We can recall that a random variable X is Poisson distributed if its probability 
distribution function is given by 
   
!Y
xfyY
y 




                                      (9)  
Where ,.....3,2,1,0Y   denotes the intensity of the Poisson process    and 0  
While the Poisson process has been used in a variety of applications, what is emphasized 
in this study is its applicability in modelling loan refusal.  is interpreted as the, we assume 
),(  vi  . Where v  a vector of explanatory variables and   refusal rate. To emphasize 
the dependency of this refusal rate on various explanatory variables’ vector of parameters to be 
estimated. 
If the number of actual loan refusals is iLR , then according to the Poisson specification, 
we have:  
 
 
!
exp
i
uLR
i
LR
LR
ii 


                                                 (10) 
Assuming we have sample loan refusal data ni LRLR ,..., , the corresponding log-
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likelihood function is the logarithm of the product of the marginal probabilities. 
 
Empirical Model for Intensity of Loan Refusal 
(24)                                                       Re                              
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Table 2: Definition, Measurement and A’ Priori Signs of Variables 
Variables Definition of the Variables  A Priori Sign 
linc Log of income of household head Negative 
lsave Log of savings amount of household head Negative 
Yrsch Years of schooling of the household head Negative 
Sex A dummy variable to capture the sex of the 
household head (0=female, 1=male) 
Indeterminate 
Age  A continuous variable that captures the age of the 
household head 
Negative 
Dep Number of people in the household below 18 years 
and above 60 years 
Positive 
Loc Location of respondents (0=urban, 1= rural area) Indeterminate 
Reg Categorical variable that captures regional effect Indeterminate 
Source: Author’s construct (2014) 
 
Data and Description 
The data used for this study was sourced from the fifth round of the Ghana Living 
Standard Survey (GLSS-5). This data is collected by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) through 
a nation-wide survey which focuses on the household as a key socio-economic unit and provides 
key insights into living conditions in the country. The most recent GLSS data available was 
collected in 2005/2006 and contains data on household-level socio-economic characteristics such 
as education, health, consumption, income, economic activities and demographic characteristics 
as well as community information. The data gives a nationally representative sample on 8,687 
households that were selected by giving each of them a non-zero probability of being selected. 
Data was collected by asking households to answer a set of questions and that made the study 
follow the direct elicitation approach to identifying credit constrained (loan refused) households 
 
Data justification 
The data included 8,622 households after the separate files were merged. From this 
sample, the loan refusal variable was 8, 622, of which 388 (4.5%) had been refused loan while 
the remaining 8,234 (95.5%) had not been refused loan. The loan refusal variable had no missing 
observations but the number of households that owned a savings account was 1,994 and had 
missing observations of 6,628, making the total number of missing observations stand at 6.628. It 
is worthy to note that other variables that were included in the analysis also had missing 
observations and, as a result, reduced the sample size that was consistent across the dependent 
and independent variables to 1,600. This was the actual sample size that was used in the analysis 
and is shown in Figure 2 
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Source: Derived from GLSS 5, 2005/2006 
 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows the percentage of Ghanaian households that have been refused loans. 
Currently, the national figure for loan refusal in Ghana stands at 4.5 percent and is greater in the 
rural areas (5.42%) than in the urban areas (3.43%). This means that the probability of one being 
refused loan in the rural area is greater than another person in the urban area. This could be 
attributed to the fact that loan applicants in the urban areas, on the average, lack viable 
businesses and are unable to write good business plans that have better potentials of securing the 
required capital for the realization of investment projects.  
 
Table 3: Loan Refusal by Location in Ghana 
Location  
Loan Refusal 
 
 
Not Refused (%) Refused (%) Total 
Urban 
 
96.57 3.43 100 
Rural 
 
94.58 5.42 100 
Total   95.50 4.50 100 
N= 1,600                           Pearson chi2(1) =  15.5867   Pr = 0.000 
Source: Computed from GLSS 5, 2005/2006 
 
Table 4 displays the number of times (intensity) of loan refusal faced by households in 
Ghana. It can be seen that majority (95.2%) of the households have not suffered loan refusal, 3.2 
percent of the households have suffered loan refusal once, 1.0 percent have suffered twice, 0.4 
percent have suffered loan refusal thrice and 0.2 percent of the households have suffered loan 
Figure 2: Data justification 
Total number of 
households=8,622 
Total Missing=6,628 
Final Sample 
Size=1,600 
Household savings    
=1,994 
Missing for Household 
savings =6, 628 
Missing for Loan 
refusal = 0.00 
Loan Refusal=8622 
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refusal four times. It can be concluded that the highest loan refusals to been suffered by 
households is four, with the minimum being zero (none). 
 
Table 4: Number of Times (Intensity) of Loan Refusal 
Number of Loan Refusals Frequency Percentage 
No Refusal (0) 1,523 95.2 
Refused Once (1) 51 3.2 
Refused Twice (2) 16 1.0 
Refused Thrice (3) 6 0.4 
Refused Four Times (4) 4 0.2 
Totals 1,600 100 
Source: Computed from GLSS 5, 2005/2006 
Figure 3 indicates that in spite of the initial increases in the value of both income levels 
and loan refusal (positive relationship), these variables began having a negative relationship 
beyond the initial situation. This negative relationship between income and loan refusal 
characterized all subsequent income categories. It should also be noted that the insignificant chi-
square value can be attributed to the fact that the income categories were generated during the 
data management process and the boundaries were not of equal size due to challenges in the 
distribution of observations in the income variable. The significance of the income variable will 
be determined using the regression analysis, where the variable is used in the continuous form 
and not in categories. The inverse relationship between income and loan refusal can be seen, 
possibly, as emanating from the credit worthiness of high income earners since they are believed 
to have higher abilities of paying back the loan plus interest (BoG, 2007). 
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Figure 3: Loan Refusal by Income Categories 
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Figure 4 depicts a negative/inverse relationship between savings and loan refusal. This is 
because households’ savings serve as a security to the financial institutions in case of loan 
default. In the microfinance industry, where some microfinance institutions demand compulsory 
savings before granting loans, savings plays a vital role in the institutions’ loan decisions. The 
inverse relationship between household savings and loan refusal is not surprising because 
savings has always been a means by which potential borrowers prove how credit-worthy they are 
(Goldstein et al., 1999). 
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Figure 4: Loan Refusal by Savings Categories 
 Source: Computed from GLSS 5, 2005/2006 
 
Table 5 shows a cross-group frequencies of reasons for loan refusal by regions. 
Insufficient income, apart from being the most cited reason for loan refusal, was more prevalent 
(32.11%) in the Ashanti Region than any other. The Ashanti Region was followed by the Eastern 
Region (19.27%), then by Greater Accra and the three Northern regions, both with 8.26 percent. 
For Insufficient collateral, the problem was more in both Eastern and Brong-Ahafo regions 
which recorded 20 percent across the board. After these two regions came Ashanti (15.29%) and 
then Greater Accra (12.94%). Going further, the region that experienced most cases of previous 
debt problems was Eastern Region(28%) followed by Ashanti Region(24%) and then by Brong 
Ahafo (16%). As regards inappropriate purpose for application, the region that recorded the most 
incidence was, again, the Eastern Region (30%), followed by Ashanti Region (25%) which was 
also followed by Western, Greater Accra and Northern regions, each with 10 percent. 
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Table 5: Reasons for Loan Refusal by Administrative Regions (Across-Group Frequencies) 
  Reason for Loan Refusal  
  
Region 
Insufficient 
Income (%) 
Insufficient 
Collateral (%) 
Previous 
Debt 
Problems 
(%) 
Inappropriate 
Purpose for 
Application 
(%) 
Other 
Reasons 
(%) Total (n) 
Western 3.67 9.41 0.00 10 1.19 4.96 
Central 3.67 7.06 12.00 2.5 2.38 4.66 
Greater Accra 8.26 12.94 12.00 10 1.19 8.16 
Volta 6.42 3.53 4.00 7.5 3.57 4.96 
Eastern 19.27 20.00 28.00 30 34.52 25.07 
Ashanti 32.11 15.29 24.00 25 13.1 21.87 
Brong-Ahafo 7.34 20.00 16.00 5 14.29 12.54 
Northern 8.26 4.71 4.00 10 13.1 8.45 
Upper East 5.5 2.35 0.00 0 1.19 2.62 
Upper West 5.5 4.71 0.00 0 15.48 6.71 
Total (n) 100 (512) 100 (400) 100 (112) 100 (273) 100 (384) 100 (1600) 
Pearson chi2(36) = 73.7869                     Pr = 0.000 
Source: Computed from GLSS 5, 2005/2006 
 
Regression results 
Regression Analysis on the Effect of Income and Savings on Loan Refusal 
The study focuses on two main variables, income and savings, and how they influence 
the likelihood of loan refusal. These results have been presented in Table 5. The Pseudo R2 = 
0.1222 indicates that 12 percent of the variations in loan refusal is explained by the covariates. 
Post-estimation tests like the linktest and Hosmer-Lemeshow were conducted to test for 
model specification and goodness-of-fit respectively. The scores for _hat (P>|z|= 0.041) and 
_hatsq (P>|z|=0.797) for the linktest shows that the model is correctly specified. This means that 
we can, only by chance, find additional predictors that are statistically significant. As regards the 
goodness-of-fit test, the Hosmer-Lemeshow gave a score of Prob > chi2 = 0.4566 which is 
greater than 0.05 and indicates that the model is of good-fit. In this model, the savings variable 
has a near perfect relationship with the Upper East and Upper West regional dummies and they 
are dropped for consistency in coefficients.  
Household income has a negative relationship with loan refusal. This indicates that a 
GH₵1.00 increase in household income reduces the likelihood of being refused loan (compared 
to not being refused) by a factor of 0.834, holding all other variables constant. This means that 
richer households are less likely to be refused loan, compared to poorer households in Ghana. 
This variable is significant at 10 percent alpha level and has a sign that is consistent with what 
pertains in the literature. This also places low-income households at in a situation of being likely 
to be discouraged from taking loans (Weller, 2007). From this stance, it is not surprising that a 
study by BoG (2007) showed that the formal financial sector has provided very little or no 
services to low-income people, creating a high demand for credit and savings services amongst 
the poor. 
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On household savings, this study finds an inverse relationship between this variable and 
loan refusal. It can be seen from the regression analysis that holding all other variables constant, 
a GH₵1.00 increase in savings amount decreases the likelihood of a household being refused 
loan, compared to not being refused, by a factor of 0.838 at a 10 percent significance level. It can 
be inferred that savings, in the Ghanaian context, plays an integral role in a household’s access to 
credit. Thus, not having enough savings amount increases the likelihood of a household being 
refused loan upon application. Goldstein et al. (1999), cited in Mensah (2009), showed how 
beneficiaries are required to possess a certain quantum of savings before benefiting from any 
loan facility. Low-savings households, by implication, will also have a higher perception of 
being turned down and, in effect, be discouraged from applying for loans (Cheng, 2009). 
Age of the household head also inversely relates to loan refusal and can be attributed to 
the fact that as people age, their acquisition of more social and economic resources places them 
at a vantage point when it comes to loan acquisition and reduces their probability of being 
refused loans. Regarding the location of a loan applicant (in this case, rural area), the regression 
analysis shows that a loan applicant in the rural area stands a higher risk of being refused, 
compared to another applicant in the urban area. This could stem from the limited number of 
financial institutions in the rural areas which also limits the total amount of loanable funds available 
thereby increasing the tendency of financial institutions to resort to rationing and discouraging of 
borrowers. Finally, the number of dependents is positively related to loan refusal. An increase in 
the number of dependents by one person increases the likelihood of being refused loan, 
compared to not being refused, by a factor of 1.142 at an alpha level of 10 percent, holding all 
other variables constant. This relationship can be deduced as arising from the huge pressure on 
the income of the household used for consumption purposes and which leaves them with very 
little income to fall on in times of need. 
 
Regression Analysis on the Effects of Income and Savings on the Intensity of Loan Refusal 
This section puts forward the findings from the Poisson regression model (PRM) (from 
Table 5) which considers, into detail, the earlier discussed binary loan refusal variable to now 
look at the binary variable as a count variable, taking into account the number of times of loan 
refusals beyond one. This is what has been considered as the intensity of loan refusal. Just like 
the logit model, the exponential of the Poisson regression coefficient gives the incidence rate 
ratio (IRR) and is used in the analysis that follows.  
Household income is inversely related to the intensity of loan refusal. A GH₵1.00 
increase in household income decreases the likelihood of the intensity of loan refusal by a factor 
0.837 at 10 percent alpha level, holding all other variables constant. This seeks to explain that 
low income households stand a higher risk of being intensely refused. This finding is supported 
by that of McKenchnie (2005) who was of the view that the intensity of loan refusal for low-
income households is likely to be more because they lack the collateral needed to secure 
financial transactions. Low-income households’ lack of collateral also leads them to be 
cognitively biased into thinking that they will be refused if they apply for loan. This eventually 
turn low-income households into discouraged borrowers (Weller, 2007). 
Going on to household savings, it can be seen that the intensity of loan refusal is likely to 
be reduced by a factor of 0.895 as a result of a GH₵1.00 increase in the amount of household 
savings at a 10 percent alpha level, holding all other variables constant. This might be the result 
of the compulsory deposits put forward by Rosenberg, Gonzalez and Narain (2010) that some 
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MFIs require borrowers to make before they can benefit from a loan. Low savings also turn 
households into discouraged borrowers because they feel they stand a higher risk of being 
refused (Cheng, 2009). 
The age of the household head also inversely relates to the intensity of loan refusal in that as 
the household head ages, the likelihood of the rate ratio of refusal decreases by a factor of 0.975 at a 
significance level of five percent, holding all other variables constant. It can be deduced that younger 
household heads stand a greater risk of being discouraged from loan application (Kon & Storey, 
2013) and so do rural dwellers (Leyshon & Thrift, 1996). Regarding location, it can be deduced from 
Table 6 that residing in the rural area is likely to increase the intensity of loan refusal by a factor of 
2.622 more than residing in the urban area at a 0.1 percent alpha level, holding all other variables 
constant. Finally, an increase in the number of dependents in a household increases the intensity of 
loan refusal by a factor of 1.143 as the number of dependents in household increase. 
 
Table 6: Logit Model for Loan Refusal 
 Logit Model  Poisson Regression Model (PRM) 
Loan Refusal 
Odds 
Ratio 
Marginal 
Effect P>z 
  
IRR 
Marginal  
Effect 
 
P>z 
Log of Income 0.834 -0.008 0.095+  0.837 -0.008 0.051+ 
 (0.091) (0.004)   (0.076) (0.004)  
Log of Savings 0.874 -0.006 0.064+  0.895 -0.004 0.094+ 
 (0.063) (0.003)   (0.059) (0.003)  
Sex (male) 1.068 0.003 0.816  1.106 0.006 0.692 
 (0.302) (0.012)   (0.282) (0.011)  
Age 0.973 -0.001 0.023*  0.975 -0.001 0.024* 
 (0.012) (0.001)   (0.011) (0.001)  
Years of Schooling 0.940 -0.003 0.185  0.946 -0.002 0.229 
 (0.044) (0.002)   (0.044) (0.002)  
Location (Rural) 2.694 0.041 0.000***  2.622 0.045 0.000*** 
 (0.729) (0.012)   (0.683) (0.013)  
Dependents 1.142 0.006 0.059+  1.143 0.006 0.029* 
 (0.081) (0.003)   (0.070) (0.003)  
Region 
   
    
Western 0.236 -0.015 0.216  0.241 -0.016 0.213 
 (0.276) (0.012)   (0.275) (0.013)  
Central 1.498 0.009 0.605  1.592 0.013 0.529 
 (1.170) (0.019)   (1.177) (0.020)  
Greater Accra 1.788 0.015 0.409  1.648 0.014 0.470 
 (1.257) (0.017)   (1.138) (0.018)  
Eastern 4.620 0.063 0.018*  3.873 0.060 0.026* 
 (2.983) (0.022)   (2.354) (0.022)  
Ashanti 2.696 0.031 0.110  2.550 0.031 0.112 
 (1.672) (0.015)   (1.502) (0.015)  
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Table 6 Continued        
Brong-Ahafo 3.877 0.051 0.038*  3.529 0.053 0.040* 
 (2.531) (0.022)   (2.166) (0.022)  
Northern 4.696 0.064 0.037*  4.194 0.067 0.048* 
 (3.484) (0.035)   (3.044) (0.042)  
Upper East - - -  2.36E-07 -0.021 0.000*** 
    
 (1.43E-
07) (0.012) 
 
Upper West - - -  3.40E-07 -0.021 0.000*** 
    
 (2.21E-
07) (0.012) 
 
Constant 0.072 
 
0.017*  0.059  0.005** 
 (0.079)    (0.059)   
N=1600  N= 1591   
Pseudo R2  = 0.1222  Pseudo R
2= 0.1263 
Hosmer – Lemeshaw       Prob > chi2 = 0.4566 
 Hosmer–Lemeshaw: Prob>chi2=  
0.9971 
Linktest  _hat:    P>|z|= 0.041   _hatsq: P>|z|= 0.797 
 Linktest  _hat: P>|z|= 0.137  
_hatsq: P>|z|=  0.901 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses   
+ p<0.10   *p<0.05   **p<0.01    ***p<0.001 
Source: Computed from GLSS 5, 2005/2006 
 
Conclusions and policy reflections  
From the analysis on household income and loan refusal, both in the logit and Poisson 
models, it was shown that Ghanaian households with low income are refused loans and that the 
formal financial institutions have provided very little or no services to low-income households 
which has, in turn, created a high demand for credit among the poor. With the reasons cited 
above, low-income households stand a greater risk of being refused loans compared to their 
high-income counterparts, which makes low-income households likely to be discouraged from 
taking loans. 
On household savings, the phenomena of compulsory savings was seen as taking centre 
stage in the process of loan acquisition. Savings requirement is so entrenched that some 
institutions see these savings amounts as another avenue to secure the loan that is to be 
advanced. Low-savings households then perceive that they will be turned down if they are to 
apply for loans, which makes them discouraged borrowers. 
With the role household income plays in loan refusal, it is worthwhile to call for a policy 
that properly addresses the needs of the financially underserved. The financially underserved are 
considered as the poor households, households with more dependents and those in rural areas. By 
addressing this problem, these households would have access to resources that would generate 
income for them and reduce their vulnerability when it comes to loan refusal.  
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